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Note TOPICS, Professors, and Scholarship: An
Autobiographical Sketch of a Law School
Experience
Jason Broth *
Introduction
How does a law student fonn a note topic? Typically, a student is
instructed to find a pressing legal issue about which no one has yet written.
That student finds the relevant cases, journal articles, and any other
applicable materials written on this topic. He or she then uses these
materials to summarize the current state of the law, expose the problem
with the law, and propose some sort of remedy, while making certain that
the work includes an outrageous number of footnotes to justify its
scholastic value. Most, or at least many, students use this approach to
note-writing. It was what I began to do before frustration overtook me.
This process of note-writing leads toward topics regarding narrow issues of
law, such as differing liability under each state's particular tort statute or
how the criminal law fails to adequately address a specific problem. I do
not intend to degrade this type of topic, as many lawyers and perhaps
judges find these articles useful. The narrow manner in which the notes are
constructed, however, causes them to become abstracted from the questions
that press at the heart of the legal system and, as such, possess value for
only a small class of people.
It is important that at least some notes deal with the broader issues of
the legal system rather than narrow issues of law. Only through an
examination of these broader systemic issues can individuals begin to have
an effect on the way in which the legal system functions within our society
and thereby suggest alternatives to address the broader economic and social
problems that persist in this nation. Some note writers should attempt to
study questions about the legitimacy of the legal system, the problems and

* The author is a 1996 graduate of University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. This piece was originally composed as his student note. He would like to give
special thanks to Michelle Robbins for her invaluable assistance in preparing this work.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

113

114

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7: 1

biases built into the way in which law is practiced and taught, alternative
perspectives of the law, and other more philosophical, critical, and
theoretical approaches to the legal profession and legal scholarship. This
is the direction in which I will proceed with this note.
Some readers of this introduction may be thinking, "Here we go
again ... with another Critical Legal Studies (CLS) person complaining
about the problems of the legal system ... another young Duncan Kennedy
reader about to attack the hierarchy of the law." Perhaps this is a fair
assessment of my project. I concur with most of Kennedy's insights and
observations detailed in his splendid 1982 essay, "Legal Education as
Training for Hierarchy."1 To some degree, it is difficult for me to avoid
duplicating Kennedy. This piece, however, is far more autobiographical
than Kennedy's work; it combines Kennedy's critical style with the
autobiographical format of books like One L2 or Broken Contract. 3 With
this in mind, a brief description of Kennedy's essay provides a necessary
foundation for the reader.
The guiding idea in Kennedy's essay, which he announces in the first
sentence, is that law school is a political environment, despite the attempt
of the law school system to appear neutra1. 4 This appearance of neutrality
insidiously forces the law student to engage the law school experience in
a particular manner and manipulates the student unknowingly into a
particular ideological attitude toward law, society, and the economy. At the
same time, the student becomes a part of the hierarchy that is law school
in order to join the greater hierarchy that is in fact the legal system.
Kennedy describes this system by discussing legal education and legal
teaching techniques in a general manner and then shows how these
techniques contribute to the disorientation, followed by the metamorphosis,
of the students. 5 He also describes why it is nearly impossible, even for
the leftist student, to be critical of the law school experience. 6 On this
point, I believe Kennedy's essay is somewhat dated and is perhaps where
my particular experience in law school will extend and redevelop
Kennedy's thinking.
Kennedy writes that most left thinkers are basically helpless at the
hands of the curriculum because they have only two tools of analysis at
their disposal: "rights" analysis or traditional Marxism. 7 The former, he
1. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 38-58 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
2. SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (1977).
3. RICHARD KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARV ARD LAW SCHOOL

(1992).
4. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 38.
5. Id. at 38-43.
6. Id. at 46-47.
7. !d. at 46.

Winter 1996]

A LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCE

115

and I both agree, is seductive yet ultimately illogical and cannot lead to a
meaningful transformation of society. The latter is "critical of law but also
dismissive"g because it envisions law as a lackey of class conflict; this
approach results in an entire rejection of the system without allowing one
to engage with it and then criticize it from within.
Although I agree that some left students are mired down in these two
types of thinking, many contemporary students' exposure to Jacques
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, and Georg Lukacs at the
undergraduate level has armed them with additional ammunition in their
arsenal of critical analysis. 9 Previously, these thinkers were primarily
studied by graduate students, but, as commonly occurs over time, their
writings filtered down to the lower levels as they became more "canonical"
and accepted. As a result, I will focus on the complexity and personal
disparity of the new left student in dealing with the situation in law school
and the alienation created by the legal education system, a topic that
Kennedy only addresses in his conclusion. I will also discuss the
prevailing attitudes in society toward education generally, attitudes which
have increasingly. made the 1990s a hostile place for many progressive
thinkers. I will use my own experiences to illustrate my points and trace
my history from the end of my college years to the writing of this note as
a way of allowing any individual, lawyer or not, to reflect on the trend in
American colleges and universities. This note is not meant to be an
empirical study; I do not pretend to speak for anybody else's experience
but my own. Even with that in mind, however, I feel that the observations
of an individual can be used as a tool to reflect on the entirety of the
system and the trend in society. Ultimately, I hope to show that the
changes in our universities result from a backlash by some scholars based
not on intellectual difference but on a prejudice that is deeply imbedded in
the Anglo-American system. Finally, this discreditation of new left
thinking is a means to thwart social change and to reinforce the corporate
vision of America.

I.

Prior to Law School

The formulation of this topic was a hard fought battle, yet it was within
this battle that I found myself confronted with the same questions about the
appropriate role of a progressive thinker that have plagued me since my
college years. I was an English major at Vassar College, where I spent the
bulk of my final two years studying not only literature but also literary

8. /d. at 47.
9. These four authors are all 20th Century continental thinkers. Derrida and Foucault are
usually equated with French postmodemism. Benjamin and Lukacs are two of the major
neo-Marxist philosophers.
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theory and philosophy. I was especially close to two of my professors,
each of whom had Yale Ph.D.s and studied under Harold Bloom. Through
my personal and academic association with them, I developed a strong
background in Romantic poetry and American Transcendentalism, with a
major influence from Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, 1. Hillis Miller,
Paul de Man,lo and Jacques Derrida. Simultaneously, I had a great
personal interest in Indian literature, culture, and storytelling; accordingly,
I studied the works of Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Claude LeviStrauss and some "post-colonial" critics, including Gayatri Spivak. II
The culminating event of these studies was the creation of my senior
thesis, which addressed a book entitled The Education of Little Tree. 12
This perplexing fictional work was a best seller as an American Indian
autobiography. It was not written by an Indian, however, but by Forrest
Carter, a former Ku Klux Klan member and known southern white racist.
The factual situation surrounding this book was perfect for a poststructuralist discussion of the issues of author, text, authenticity, meaning,
and beauty. I used the above-mentioned theorists to examine, de-construct,13 and semiotically explore both the text and, importantly, the
critical and popular reaction to the text. This thesis was not simply about
an enigmatic book. Rather, this book was a vehicle to use critical theory
to reflect on the prevailing culture that created it, loved it, and then finally
loathed and discarded it.
Within this project, I discovered not only the "academic" value of
critical theory but also the "real world" implications that it imports.
Critical theory can compel educators to confront the issues of what we
should read, why we should read it, and how it will influence our system

10. These four scholars were all professors at Yale University and came to be known as
"the Yale School." Their primary literary focus was in Romantic poetry, though their
contribution to literary theory, especially that of Bloom and de Man, was great.
11. The importance of Barthes and Foucault in this area is their development of
semiotics, the study of the system of signs. Levi-Strauss was a social anthropologist and
a forerunner of structuralism. Spivak is currently a noted critic of post-colonial literature.
12. FORREST CARTER, THE EDUCATION OF LITTLE TREE (University ofN.M. Press 1986)
(1976).
13. Although the word is usually written as "deconstruction," without the hyphen, I
decided to use the style in which Derrida originally writes the word so as to draw some
attention to its constituent parts. I feel that this brief treatment of deconstruction is necessary
because of the many legal scholars who have broadly misunderstood the idea and its process
and, as a result, are likely to dismiss any scholarship which fails to make some sort of direct
treatment of this concept when it is raised. These scholars tend to think of deconstruction
as the explosive and chilling destruction of some sacred edifice. As Derrida himself
explains when he introduces the word in Of Grammatology, demolition is not the proper
metaphor for his concept: "Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but
the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in
that of the logos." JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 10 (Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak trans., 1976).
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of apprehending the world. Exploring these issues is not about changing
the lives of individuals in dramatic ways or reforming the ills of society in
a moment. Rather, it is about infusing into the discourse a self-reflective
aspect which, over time, will hopefully generate greater societal examination of our situations and the influences in our lives. Imbedded in this
summary lies my belief that a scholar who challenges our assumptions
about the world possesses the potential power to influence change and
make a proverbial difference. 14
As is common with many graduating college seniors today, I was
confronted with the question of what course of graduate study to pursue.
This decision was as difficult for me as it was for many other law school
students whom I have subsequently met. Even though we came from a
wide variety of academic fields, we still faced the same dilemma: do I
choose the field which I feel is more challenging, more intellectually
exciting, and closer to my heart, or do I go to law school? Obviously, this
phrasing of the question reflects my bias. Despite this bias, I, like many
others who share it, made the choice to go to law school. How does one
account for this discrepancy between desire and decision?
Several explanations for this phenomenon exist, but I consider two to
be the most relevant. The first regards the pure economics of the matter.
The career opportunities in many academic fields, particularly English,
which would have been my choice, are limited. Professorships are
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, and there are few other jobs for
which a Ph.D. is not an over-qualification. On the other hand, no matter
how many complaints there are about our society's excess of lawyers,
numerous jobs are available to an individual with a law degree. Additionally, a lawyer has the potential for earning a great deal of money,
particularly at the high end of the economic spectrum. Although this was
not my goal, being able to obtain a job was. Many students feel that in
order to make the costly investment of attending graduate school, they must
be assured of a return; thus, they frequently choose law school over the
competing field. IS
Secondly, many people choose law school over competing academic
fields because of the old-fashioned belief that the law can be a vehicle for
social justice and social change. This notion was largely influential on my
own decision to attend law school. Although a philosophy or English
professor may influence society through both teaching and writing, that
effect is long-term (multi-generational), abstract, and somehow always

14. I use this word "difference" in its ordinary meaning.
15. Although the critique of a system that, in effect, prefers tort and contract attorneys
to molecular biologists and authors might be appropriate, that topic will be left to others
who think in this same vein.
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deferred. Reminiscent in my mind is the beginning of the Langston
Hughes poem "Dream Boogie":
Good morning, daddy!
Ain't you heard
The boogie-woogie rumble
Of a dream deferred?
Listen closely:
You'll hear their feet
Beating out and beating out a-You think
It s a happy beat?16

Although the project of incremental change is of extraordinary importance,
this section of Hughes' poem strikes a heartstring with me regarding the
uncertainty of it all. It is a dream, but how do you know that it will
happen? How do you know that you are moving toward it without any
tangible evidence? Even the noted literary critic Henry Louis Gates
instructed, "I tell students who want to change the world to go into a
different field."I? The law offers a seemingly more aggressive, proactive,
and tangible approach to reform. In Marxist terms, even though one does
not see the discourse change, one can see the wealth redistributed. To a
young progressive, as Kennedy and I concur, this is the lure of the law.
This choice to pursue a legal education over one in an academic field
does not, however, represent an abandonment of the learnings of contemporary thinkers. In the naivete of the graduating college student lurks the
unfounded hope that one will be able to merge Marx, Freud, and Derrida
with the teachings of a legal education. Unfortunately, only an occasional
law school professor welcomes this type of thought. Admissions policies
are designed to thwart it, hiring policies are designed to disfavor it, and
grading and ranking schemes, as well as the bar exams, are created to stifle
it. Virtually everything in the law school setting and, in fact, in society in
general has been put in a position to discredit progressive thinking. This
realization invoked in me first a sense of alienation and later the hostility
that has led to this note, in which I will trace chronologically the
intellectual inadequacies I have encountered through my first two years of
law school.

16. LANGSTON HUGHES, SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 221 (1959).
17. Gary Kamiya, Civilization & Its Discontents, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 22, 1995, (Magazine), at 19.
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II. One L
Although I felt somewhat guilty and saddened by the pragmatic
decision that I had made in coming to law school, I entered with an air of
optImIsm. My first semester classes were Contracts, Property, Civil
Procedure and Criminal Law. Of the four, I was most excited about
Property and Criminal Law, as I felt that these classes were directly
relevant to the lives of a huge segment of the population, and I had already
formulated many of my own critiques of the existing systems in these
areas. It was not long before I realized that my extra-legal thinking
regarding these and the other areas of the law which I was studying had
little place for expression. These thoughts had, at best, borderline relevance
to the lives of most students and professors, who viewed them as some sort
of academic or artistic oddity. They were like paintings to be hung on the
wall, glanced at sometimes, admired occasionally, discussed rarely, and
even more rarely meditated upon. Law school was only for learning the
way in which the law worked.
With this understanding, I tried to do outside reading to supplement my
case books and maintain a connection to those underlying philosophies and
principles that had guided me toward law school. I purchased two books
that semester to satisfy these cravings: Discipline & Punish by Michel
Foucault l8 and an essay collection entitled The Politics of Law. 19 I read
all of the Foucault book and parts of the other book, generally finding them
to be thoughtful and distinguished works. Unfortunately, the time
constraints and institutional pressures of my required homework prevented
me from continuing my outside reading. Although I felt no great desire to
be in the top of my class, I still felt the pressure of the grading system
because of its constant presence in many other student's minds. Thus, my
outside reading was diminished.
Perhaps even more harmful than my limited exposure to critical reading
material during my first semester was the lack of teachers and colleagues
who were interested in discussing and exploring these ideas. Prior to my
law school experience, a huge portion of the learning process in my life
had been comprised of intellectual interaction with students in an intimate
atmosphere. This type of interaction did not exist in the first year of law
school. Classes were large and lecture-oriented. Law professors did not
expect creative or alternative thinking; in fact, they discouraged such
thinking and, instead, favored those with the ability to quickly explain the
facts, issues, and holdings of cases. There was no discourse; there was an
examination. Kennedy has been comprehensive and critical on the issue of
18. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
19. THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 1982).
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the teaching style in law school,2° so I end my discussion here in favor of
one regarding the law school student body.
The rigid focus by the admissions board on grades and LSAT scores
has lead to the acceptance of many students who have chosen law school
for the respect accorded to lawyers by family and friends and the high
average salaries that lawyers make. There is seemingly little personal focus
in the admissions process on the goals and motivations of the students,
except perhaps as an afterthought to grades and test scores. As a result,
many left-thinking students who regard law school not as a precisely
calculated career move but as a means of putting themselves in a position
to achieve some social goal are excluded from top law schools because
they simply do not make the grade. 21 Accordingly, my intellectual
interaction with many of my colleagues was on matters which to me were
superficial, and my ability to advance radical conceptions of the law
dwindled more each day. Ultimately, my first semester was filled with an
exceptional feeling of loneliness tempered only by assurances from my
faculty advisor that there were others like me and that in the second year
I would have more freedom in choosing my classes and thus be better able
to find my niche.
My second semester was substantially like my first in terms of the
classes and professors that I had. Thus, my initial feelings about law
school remained essentially unchanged, with one slight variation. The
intimidation of the classroom environment gradually decreased as the
students became more accustomed to the method, and many began to feel
more comfortable and relaxed. As my own intimidation level lessened,
however, my resentment began to blossom. During this semester, much of
my frustration and sadness began to tum into the anger that I described in
the opening of this essay. Rather than catalog my thoughts and feelings,
however, I will relate two anecdotes from my second semester where my
alienation in law school readily surfaced.
My Contracts course was year-long and taught by a conservative
faculty member. During the second semester, the course reached the topic
of unconscionability. The professor was examining a case in which the
court had used this doctrine to rule a contract void. The terms of the
contract suggested that one party used its wealth and legal knowledge to
the severe disadvantage of the other party, who was in a dis empowered
position. The professor acknowledged this point but then proceeded to
explain why this case represents terrible decision-making because it departs

20. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 50-56.
21. This is not to say that left-thinking students have poor scores and grades but that they
may be more concerned with intellectual development and thereby less focused on grades
and, particularly, standardized test scores.
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from the rules and thereby undermines the determinability of the law, thus
driving up the cost of business and making it worse for everybody (except,
of course, the plaintiff in the case). I responded to the professor with an
opposing point of view, indicating to him that there were fallacies in his
description of the market, that unconscionability is as predictable a rule as
any other, and that it is not "bad policy" for judges to intervene on the
behalf of parties who are in unfairly disadvantaged bargaining positions.
He accepted my argument without much response other than asking me
how my "tender conscience" felt about the result in the next case, which
brought rolls of laughter from the class. I had just been taught a lesson.
Law school was not a discussion; it was dictation. As I had previously
thought but had not proven until that moment, this professor would not
allow dissent. His response to me did not address the merits of my
argument but was to ridicule my political position as naive, nurturing,
effeminate and clearly other than the "law." To add injury to insult, I was
then put on the other-than-Socrates end of his ritualistic Socratic dialogue.
The other relevant anecdote during my second semester amusingly
illustrates my point about the lack of engagement by many students.
During my statutory course on Consumer Health and Safety, the professor
was discussing the impact of expose literature on industry. One student,
who spoke routinely in that class, offered his opinion: (I paraphrase), "I
believe that writings like Unsafe at Any Speed22 and Slaughterhouse
Five,23 regarding the meat packing industry,... [are beneficial]." I
chuckled and shook my head, while most other students simply sat silently.
Moments later, when he finished speaking, the professor, who was herself
smiling, corrected his blunder. 24 Other than that, however, this point went
unnoticed. No one seemed to mind the confusion of two major American
literary and historical works. Why should they; this is law school, and only
the rules really matter.
My in-class introduction to legal philosophical scholarship further
distressed me. Although I will later discuss my views on the ways in
which theory from the arts and social sciences have thus far been utilized
by most legal scholars, I am including this prefatory information here since
it was directly relevant to my first year experience. In the aforementioned
Consumer Health and Safety course, the professor included a reading on
statutory interpretation written by Bill Eskridge and Phil Frickey entitled
"Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning.,,25 The piece attempted

22. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
23. KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FrvE (1972).
24. The blunder being that the student meant to refer to Upton Sinclair's classic piece,
The Jungle.
25. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990).

122

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:1

to borrow discourse from Hans-George Gadamer and later hermeneutics
theorists, but as a work of philosophy it is greatly lacking. The authors
repeatedly used overly broad generalizations, such as referring to "philosophy and literary theory,,26 as a monolith in which all scholarship is
supposedly unified and in agreement on certain issues. Also, in freely
borrowing from Gadamer and quoting small phrases out of his work, like
"hermeneutical circle,,,27 Eskridge and Frickey corrupted such phrases and
used them to justify their theory and show that it has legitimacy outside of
the legal realm. I was outraged at the abusive nature of this work; I
previously had imagined that my only problems with most "journal quality"
articles would regard the content used by, or the approach of, the author
and not the academic misrepresentation in the work.
My frustration was compounded further when we discussed the piece
in class. The most common and pervasive complaint by other students
about Eskridge and Frickey was their perpetual and unnecessary use of
large and abstruse words like hermeneutic. The professor repeatedly
encouraged these students to look beyond these words and phrases because
authors only use them "to get published in certain journals." She
comforted the students by telling them that they were not expected to know
what these words meant because, in essence, they were just "fancy-talk,"
lacking any importance in and of themselves.
These experiences reflect two of the major points that this essay seeks
to address. First, the interdisciplinary scholarship that has been written by
lawyers is often of poor quality, as a whole, relative to that produced in
other fields (at least the other fields with which I am familiar, e.g., English
and Philosophy). Secondly, and much more importantly, law school,
school in general, and society at large has grown seemingly hostile to
certain intellectual ideas. This hostility is reflected in the attitude of the
students, who ascribe the use of words and ideas with which they are
unfamiliar to a flaw in the writer rather than to their own deficiency. Even
more frightening was my witnessing of a tenured law school professor
assure these students that finding out about hermeneutics is basically a
dictionary exercise and thereby summarily dismiss the continental
philosophic tradition since Heidegger.

III. Two L
Kennedy's description of the law school curriculum closely matches my
experience. He lists the first year courses, discusses them, and then writes:

26. Id. at 334.
27. Id. at 340.

__..__. _.__
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Then there are the second- and third-year courses that expound the
moderate reformist program of the New Deal . . .. Finally, there
are peripheral subjects, like legal philosophy or legal history . . . .
These [courses] are presented as not truly relevant to the 'hard'
objective, serious, rigorous analytic core of the law; they are kind
of a playground of finishing school for learning the social art of
self-presentation as a lawyer. 28
I took both Constitutional Law and Criminal Procedure, the "reformist"
classes to which Kennedy refers, as well as Jurisprudence, the "peripheral"
type of class of which Kennedy writes. I also elected to take American
Indian Law and the Law of Archaeology and Relics. These last two
courses were small and taken by few students (presumably because of the
specific nature of the material, in which I was personally interested).
Despite the fact that I was able to "choose" my courses (this statement is
misleading, given the extreme amount of coercion built into the system
based on the size of the classes, the number of classes taught on each
subject, and the awareness of the later bar exam that covers only certain
topics), my feelings about law school remained essentially the same.
These classes, like those of my first year, were not critical of the
system that created the rules. I was excited to take Constitutional Law
because I saw that as an area in which judges only and always made policy
choices based on an arbitrary set of criteria and then justified them in a
post hoc manner using the language of prior constitutional decisions. As
a result, Constitutional Law is perhaps the best course to examine the
"logic" of the rules and expose the fact that it is not logic at all but rather
a legitimation of a set of rules and values to the benefit of certain people
and to the disadvantage of others. Unfortunately, few of these ideas
pertained to my Constitutional Law class experience. Instead, we identified
case holdings and then tested them against a series of hypothetical
questions. If they failed the scrutiny of examination, then we concluded
that the holdings should be modified. Occasionally, the class would focus
on the fact that a particular decision was made as a matter of policy and
could not properly be justified using the internal logic of constitutional law.
Basically, it was just like any and all of my other law school courses.
Jurisprudence was the topic that I most desired to study. I expected to
find others "like me" in this course and to begin discovering the philosophy
of the law. The course turned out to be the gravest disappointment yet.
The professor was a specialist in federal courts. He knew little of Critical
Legal Studies and virtually nothing about continental philosophy other than
about Immanuel Kant (via his use in Anglo-American thinking). The

28. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 44-45.
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course reading was a smattering of unchallenging works. This course
provides a fine example to support Kennedy's assertion that legal
philosophy classes are designed to polish a student's edges so as to be able
to present the facade of a lawyer when at a cocktail party.29 During the
classroom time, the professor essentially explained the works through
simplification and translation, followed by a "what's-your-opinion" type of
open-ended question directed at the entire class.
I found the class unproductive, uneducational, and taught, at best, on
the intellectual level of a freshman course in college. Even beyond those
disappointments, however, the time allocated to the respective authors and
groups frustrated me the most. Duncan Kennedy was discussed for less
than one entire class session, while Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls,30
together, were allotted approximately six class sessions. I assume the
professor considered this allocation of time well thought-out. To him,
Dworkin and Rawls were acknowledged brilliant intellectuals who had
great influence within the American legal community; thus, the course must
focus more heavily upon them. Continental philosophy, however, so badly
discredits them that, in my opinion, it renders their work impotent. This
point of view was never addressed, providing yet another example of the
uncritical approach to the law.
This failing cannot be placed solely at the feet of the course's
professor. It seems not entirely his fault that he was teaching a course for
which he was underqualified. That fact must be laid at the feet of the law
school administration.. Why wasn't someone with a deeper humanities or
CLS background teaching the course? One possible explanation is that
there are so few people of this type on the faculty that there was not one
available to teach the course. I know of not one faculty member at my law
school who would openly refer to himself or herself as a Crit. To repeat,
there is not one such person on the faculty of the largest law school in
California.
Along with the composition of the student body and the school
admissions policy, one can see an extraordinary bent in the hiring policies
away from a certain type of thinker with a particular set of ideals. This
reality can only be explained as evidence of the brewing hostility toward
far leftist thinking in our colleges and universities. My law school
seemingly wants to produce lawyers who achieve, in the traditional sense,
rather than individuals who, armed with knowledge of the law, can help

29. Id. at 45.
30. Dworkin and Rawls are generally considered to be two of the most noteworthy
current legal philosophers. Their work, however, is almost exclusively based on the AngloAmerican tradition, for which reason they often escape the wrath and critique of those who
routinely attack interdisciplinary scholarship.
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contribute to the leftist goals of radical change and redistribution of wealth
and power.

IV.

Writing My Note

I initially approached the writing of this note with great enthusiasm.
I saw it as an opportunity to relive the experience of writing my college
senior thesis, the importance of which I have previously described.
Unfortunately, the reality of the note-writing process quickly set in, and I
was adrift in attempting to formulate a topic. After much struggle,
however, a fascinating topic struck me. My theoretical background was
heavily influenced by the Yale school, and I thereby decided to apply that
background to the law. I chose Harold Bloom's theory of poetry developed
in his work The Anxiety of Influence31 and wanted to apply it to legal
works, primarily judicial opinion-writing. With this in mind, I began my
research for supporting materials and completed my preemption check.
After arduous hours of logging time on Lexis, I discovered a few articles
that mentioned or discussed Bloom and several more that cited to him. I
printed these pieces and enthusiastically began reading them.
Ultimately, I discovered that there were basically only three articles that
made more than cursory mention of Bloom and his theories. I hoped that
these articles would establish a foundation for a note which would
undertake the monumental task of reformulating Bloom's ideas about the
creative process to fit legal scholars' and judges' discussions of the law.
Bloom's writing, particularly in The Anxiety of Influence, is extraordinarily
dense and possesses an uncountable number of obscure allusions.
Accordingly, I hoped these articles would provide some framework and
reference point with which to begin my work.
The first piece, written by Charles Collier, was entitled "The Use and
Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of
Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship.,,32 Although the title suggests that the
article would readily lend itself to my topic, Collier essentially supported
a thesis antithetical to the one in this essay. He used Bloom merely to
explain that many legal scholars proceed in an interdisciplinary manner
because of "the theory of intellectual influence and revisionism. ,,33 Collier
basically contended that such scholars abuse the law by seeking "something
that law cannot offer ... an external, non-legal source of scholarly
legitimacy.,,34 He seriously simplifies the goals of interdisciplinary

31. HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973).
32. Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining
the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.l. 191 (1991).
33. !d. at 193.
34. Id. at 194.
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scholarship by primarily arguing that legal scholars cannot look to external
sources for intellectual authority.
Interdisciplinary scholarship is much more complex than Collier
suggests. This new scholarship seeks to challenge the assumptions of the
law as it stands and reconstruct new formulations of the law which (for
many scholars) are not themselves seeking legitimacy. Rather, these
reformulations are mere examples of alternative understandings that are
equally plausible but reflect a different set of underlying assumptions. For
instance, Roberto Unger describes a system in which the law is constantly
forced into making radical change so as to recognize, in my reformulation
of Unger, the illegitimacy of all positions and thereby avoid dogmatic
acceptance of anyone. 35 I am ultimately grateful to Collier for his
outstanding historical analysis that reveals how late-nineteenth century
Langdellian formalism leads to the type of narrow legal note topic that I
discussed in my introduction. 36 His treatment of Bloom's work, however,
is uninformative and limited. He only applies Bloomian theory to legal
scholars of the 1980s, explaining their use of the interdisciplinary approach
as a way of stepping out of the shadow of their precursor scholars of the
late 1950s and 1960s. 37 To borrow a word from Collier's title, this is an
unsightly "abuse" of Bloom's theory. It is not abusive in that it seeks
authority where it properly should not, as Collier claims of today's legal
scholar. Rather, it is intellectually abusive, doing extraordinary violence
to Bloom's theories by mischaracterizing them and then audaciously merely
footnoting The Anxiety of Influence.
In The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom discusses an individual poet's
relationship to a precursor poet and the specific literary tropes used by
these poets in fighting the battle to develop a creative space for themselves. 38 He never speaks of a category of thinkers, and an idea, like the
use of interdisciplinary scholarship, is not a trope at all. Although never
said directly, in many ways Collier's critique of this scholarship approaches
that of my Consumer Health and Safety teacher and is reflected in his
quotation of Geoffrey Miller: "These are times of ferment in legal
academia. Standard doctrinal analysis, which all but occupied the field a
decade ago, is now retreating before the onslaught of all sorts of fancy new
techniques.,,39 Thus, I believe that Collier's big problem in using Bloom
is that he confuses Freudian repression with the desire to be published, earn
tenure, and be hip.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

ROBERTO M. UNGER, POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987).
COLLIER, supra note 32, at 195-198.

!d. at 202.
BLOOM, supra note 31.
COLLIER, supra note 32, at 202.
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As a piece of interdisciplinary scholarship, at least on this point, Collier
is unimpressive. He did motivate me, however, to shift my note topic in
my own mind. I began to feel that I could not merely use Harold Bloom
without justifying why I was using Bloom, why such a topic is valid for a
law journal, and even why the interdisciplinary approach should continue
to be used. Ten years ago, in the 1980s, this type of scholarship was
unquestioned. But now, in the 1990s, the hostility toward this interdisciplinary approach has grown and leaves writers like myself to fight a battle
of justification. Collier's piece and his quotation of Miller are perfect
examples of the animosity toward certain left thinking that has grown in the
academic community over the past several years.
The other two pieces that I found which dealt with Bloom were entitled
"The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature,,40 and "Agon at Agora:
Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition.,,41 The first
piece, written by Kaufman, was more satisfying than Collier's piece yet
still not without its problems. Kaufman initially uses the "anxiety of
influence'~2 in a non-Bloomian sense. It refers instead to the should-be
anxiety felt by legal scholars who have failed to elevate the status of their
enterprise in response to Derrida's ingenuitive elevation of philosophy.43
This "anxiety of influence" is a conscious one and thereby merely shares
the same name as the anxiety discussed by Bloom. Later in his piece,
however, Kaufman explicitly discusses Bloom and his theories. Kaufman
effectively describes Bloom's book and uses it to make excellent insights
into law, philosophy, and even Bloom himself. He fails, however, to
actually use the Bloomian tropes to examine judicial opinion-writing.
Although extremely long, Kaufman's piece lacks specific examples of
his points and thus provides no guidance for the most difficult question of
all: how do you identify specific instances of repression in judicial decision
making? Kaufman's deficiency is acceptable, however, as his project does
not concern this issue. He asserts two goals for himself. First, he hopes
to encourage judges to elevate their decision writing. 44 Second, he hopes
to encourage others, particularly legal scholars, to be more accepting of
Derrida's insight and critical legal scholarship rather than dismissing it. 45
Though I found Kaufman's voice both comforting and friendly, it has been
at least three years since he wrote this piece, and, in my opinion, the

40. Michael 1. Kaufman, The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature, 60 FORDHAM
L. REv. 645 (1992).
41. David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition,
95 YALE L.J. 857 (1986).
42. KAUFMAN, supra note 40, at 644.
43. Id. at 648.
44. Id. at 713.
45. Id.
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hostility toward Derrida and CLS in American legal academic circles grows
increasingly more hostile despite Kaufinan's efforts.
The second above-mentioned work, "Agon at Agora" by David Cole,
is outstanding and precisely on point. Cole discusses Bloom's theories
thoroughly and with great insight; he is subtle and sensitive to the nuances
of Bloom. Cole's piece provided both a framework in which I could
operate and room for disagreement, correction, and further development of
Bloomian and related criticism in regard to the law. 46 By this time,
however, I was so troubled by my law school experiences and the Collier
article that I was unable to proceed with my original plan. Cole's article
was nearly ten years old, and I knew that a topic on Bloom could wait.
Still, I was tom between proceeding with a topic that was intellectually
challenging and stimulating, like the one on Bloom, or changing to a more
mundane, yet important and necessary, topic, such as one addressing
Collier. My decision became clear after viewing a speech on C-Span in
January, 1995, and reading an article that same month in the San Francisco
Examiner Magazine.
One morning, I happened to watch on C-Span a speech given by the
newly appointed chairperson of the Presidential Committee on Higher
Education. 47 The thrust of the speech regarded returning "values" and the
"classics" to higher education. She described the previous generation of
college students as a lost generation (likely referring to people ages 20-26),
infatuated by the valuelessness of nihilism. This generation was also, in
her opinion, dominated by relativism, the bane of society, and the inability
to appreciate beauty for what it is. She implicitly referred to French
theory, stemming from scholars like Derrida and Foucault, as the cause of
this crisis. She drew loud cheers from the audience, yet I was quite
somber. I had just discovered that I was part of a generation lost and that
my insights were less valid than those of others. I was part of the
intelligencia of Generation X and, like my lesser-educated cohorts, was
devoid of vision. Her message was clear: traditional Democratic thinking
has no room for a group of postmodern children who cannot learn to
respect the liberal credo. This irrational hostility obviously targets a certain
group of left thinkers.

46. For instance, Cole explicitly says that addressing the feminist critique of Bloom is
outside of the scope of his project. !d. at 864, n.2S. Yet that topic raises a number of
fascinating issues when considered in light of the fact that judicial writing has been male
dominated up until fairly recently. Issues surrounding ways in which judicial opinionwriting has changed since women have become a force in the judiciary raise unlimited
intriguing questions.
47. Unfortunately, it was not until several days after I saw this speech that I realized the
importance that it had for me. Thus, I am unable to cite the broadcast or even provide the
name of the speaker.
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Even more provocative to me than that speech was Gary Kamiya's
article in the Sunday, January 22, 1995, San Francisco Examiner entitled
"Civilization & Its Discontents.,,48 Kamiya basically attacks "P.C.ism" on
college campuses and discusses the short history of the battle surrounding
political correctness. The article points to the 1987 book, The Closing of
the American Mind,49 which became a surprise best seller as the beginning
of the public debate on these matters. Kamiya attacks the ideas of
"political correctness" and "diversity" as pseudonyms for affirmative action,
racism, and a senseless and unprincipled assault on tradition. so Although
Kamiya's unjust characterizations and simplifications of these issues
disturbed me, I was most angered by his use of certain phrases and words
that linked his position to that of the C-Span speaker. For instance, in his
opening paragraph, Kamiya refers to "incomprehensible French philosophical shrapnel."sl Wisely, Kamiya never mentions Derrida, Lacan, or other
French scholars so as to avoid the exceptional intellectual difficulty of
addressing their theories. Instead, he focuses on the effect, as he sees it,
of the use of these theorists in academic institutions. He points to racial
and gender conflicts on college campuses and then equates the now
common use of these thinkers with the creation of the conflicts.
By a sleight of hand, Kamiya tries to make the reader believe that high
theory is synonymous with political correctness and multiculturalism. For
example, he writes, "[bJut far more disturbing than the strained work
generated by 'engaged' literary critics is the moral intimidation practiced
by certain multicultural zealots."s2 He then explains how multiculturalism
is used as a weapon to unfairly discredit certain traditional scholars, thereby
stifling them. Kamiya ridiculously makes it appear as if only leftist
thinkers are allowed on university faculties and that all others have been
chased away. This experience is far from my own and that of other
students whom I know. Kamiya exaggerates the situation on college
campuses as a rhetorical device. He uses hyperbole in order to inflame the
reader, who is frustrated with the issues of race, gender, and poverty that
dominate the lives of today's youth. In a most Gingrichian fashion,
Kamiya hopes to enrage the public into crying for a battle to win back the
schools. The objective of this battle is not a peaceful coexistence amongst
all theorists but the annihilation of certain left thinkers. His side,
unfortunately, seems to be winning.
Toward the end of the article, Kamiya finally refers to the specific
French authors responsible for today's problems. In responding to their

48. KAMIYA, supra note 17.
49. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
50. KAMIY A, supra note 17, at 15.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 22.
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positions, he resorts to the ultimate analytical tool: ridicule. Kamiya writes,
"[e ]verything could be deconstructed; nothing was sacred. Liberalism? A
fraud. The 'autonomy of the aesthetic'? Don't make me laugh. The 'real
world'? Puh-Ieeze."53 He then relates a one-liner from "then-Education
Secretary William Bennet . . . that 'Deconstruction is like the Godfather,
it makes you an offer you can't understand. ",54 These two sarcastic
remarks each reflect separate but related points. First, there are certain
propositions so fundamental that it is not even worth the time to examine
them. Second, much like the reaction of my Consumer Health and Safety
class to hermeneutics, if there is a concept that you cannot understand, then
the philosophy behind it is too complex about which to concern yourself.
These two points expose a sentiment that is anti-intellectual, irrationally
hostile, and reflective of nothing more than a political bias and society's
prevailing attitude toward certain scholarship.
Conclusion
As previously mentioned, this note is not an empirical study and
regards only personal observation. After reading it, however, one can be
left with no doubt that at my law school, French philosophic thinking is by
no means the dominant mode of discourse. Similarly, I have found little
evidence to indicate that, except in certain isolated institutions (for instance,
the University of Colorado at Boulder, Harvard University, and SUNY
Buffalo), there is any significant number of thinkers working in this vein.
Even in his own article, Kamiya includes but glosses over the point that
Ralph Rader, who is a member of a new organization "dedicated to
championing aesthetic approaches to literature,,,55 is also the head of the
English Department at UC Berkeley, one of the top English departments in
the nation. He is anything but postmodern. Additionally, Secretary Bennet
and the new chairman of the Presidential Committee on Higher Education
have demonstrated open hostility toward French theory. Yet Kamiya and
others speak in a manner which makes it appear as if those who refuse to
engage in post-structuralist thinking are unable to achieve positions of
influence and that, as a result, havoc has been wreaked on the system. This
appears to be pure scapegoating.
The problems of multiculturalism and racism on our college campuses,
according to Kamiya and these others, is a result of nihilism brought on by
Derrida and his cohorts rather than resulting from the inherent racism in the
system brought on by a nation that has been built on racial intolerance and
disempowerment of the economic lower classes. Don't blame the system,

53. Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 21-22.
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blame individuals who fail to take personal responsibility for how they are.
This position is a counterfactuaI farce, but, like Allan Bloom's book, it
sells, and it sells big. People are tired of the message of the "politically
correct," and conservative scholars have managed to use this sentiment to
attack leftist thinking. Despite Kamiya's claims about the ease of being a
left thinker on a college campus, the fact that his article is being published
and supported indicates that he is not being entirely forthright.
Although those who discredit leftist thinkers might maintain the belief
that they speak and act in society's best interests, their beliefs are as
misguided as those supporting Gingrich and his "Contract with America. ,,56 If humanity is to advance, certain things must happen, the most
urgent of which is a redistribution of wealth. CLS and other leftist
thinking is designed to attack and expose the illegitimacy of both the legal
system and the norms underlying the legal system which are responsible for
justifying the current distribution of wealth. Such leftist thinking allows
individuals to peak behind the veil of "logic" and uncover the unfairness,
inadequacies, and biases present in our lives. For this reason, it is only in
the best interest of the wealthiest few Americans to maintain the system as
it is and discredit, ridicule, and eliminate radical thinkers. These thinkers
present a well-articulated intellectual threat to the system (much like the
threat that I presented to my Contracts professor) that has brought these
Americans wealth and power. As a result, the system has been modified
to deal with these individuals by forcing them out of colleges, not hiring
them in the first place, and accepting an indifferent student body, while, at
the same time, blaming these individuals for creating the problems that they
actually merely exposed. This is what the battle on college campuses is
actually about. This is the battle that the leftists are losing.

56. More properly described as the "Contract on America."

